

# Terrorism Situation and Its Challenges to European Union

## A Longitudinal Statistical Analysis

Zeren Langjia, Jian Shi

Terrorism is increasingly threatening world peace and stability, not least during the post-9/11 era. In particular, viewed from Europe's geographical proximity to areas of conflicts, terrorism is a greater menace to European continental peace, security and stability. As a natural consequence, terrorism becomes a top concern of the European Union (EU). In practice, it comes to be not merely necessary but also important to have a better and clearer idea about terrorist landscapes in Europe so that future counterterrorism will be well grounded in a faithful representation of reality. The authors, drawing upon data selected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), have categorised the terrorist incidents according to the different scales of casualties, provided a longitudinal overview of completed terrorism attacks from 1970 to 2015 with a special focus on the most terrorism-stricken Member States (MSs), and statistically analysed the terrorist situation within the EU and counterterrorism challenges. In doing so, authors have intention to find the ins and outs of terrorist incidents, to probe the motivations of perpetrators, and to clarify the faulty generalisations about terrorism. The article concludes that an increasingly stronger sense of nationalism is emerging, Islamic terrorism is not rising at a dramatic speed but in a more destructive way, and more importantly civilians

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are becoming the dominant target group of terror attacks. It is further argued that these three factors are not only the tough challenges but also top concerns of counterterrorism.

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Terrorism is unprecedentedly challenging regional and global peace, security and stability. No one can get rid of it. In particular, Europe's geographical proximity to areas of conflicts explicitly indicates that the EU cannot turn a blind eye to terrorism and its causes but instead must face it. However, terrorism could be either a touchstone of or a stumbling block towards European integration. All depends on how the EU and its Member States (MSs) respond to it. In the past few years, Europe has experienced consecutive terror attacks that have dramatically increased social tension, but unfortunately no one can predict when and where the next attack is going to happen. People feel intense uncertainty about their security due to the unpredictability of terror, which is further intensified by its multiple and intertwined causes. Therefore, historically following the trend of attacks, longitudinally collecting terrorist data, and statistically analysing the data come to the fore.

To longitudinally collect terrorist data and follow the variation of the times can make valuable contributions to better understanding of contemporary terrorism. A more direct observation and recognition of contemporary terrorism could be drawn through statistical data analysis of the variation in the number of incidents. The selected data are from a reputable open-source database called the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which includes systematic data on domestic and international terrorist incidents and detailed information on the incidents.<sup>1</sup> The article is thus developed in an effort to provide an overview of the terrorist landscape in Europe, to explore underlying problems behind the diverse terrorist acts with a view to clarifying faulty generalisations and viewing terrorism correctly, and to eventually propose some possible suggestions for counterterrorist challenges and policies.

To start with, terrorism is a very controversial term to define. As various scholars and institutions have attempted to define the term *Terrorism*, its definitions vary from one to another and thus there does not exist an agreed-upon definition.<sup>2</sup> That said, there are at least 212

different definitions of terrorism all around the world.<sup>3</sup> These definitions can be further categorised into legal and non-legal definitions of the term because non-governmental and governmental institutions define terrorism differently. Of all these definitions, the authors' understanding of terrorism is grounded in Mareri's research result of the three common elements existing in the legal definitions of the US, Britain and Germany: the use of violence, political goals, and causing fear and terror in the targeted groups.<sup>4</sup> This finding is in consonance with the result achieved through a social science approach. According to a content analysis of over a hundred definitions by Schmid and Jongman (1988), the three elements are also the top three components of terrorism, of which violence emerges in 83.5% of definitions, political purpose in 65%, and terror impact in 51%.<sup>5</sup> As these two descriptions about terrorism are also highly aligned with GTD's definition of a terrorist attack, which is defined as 'the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation',<sup>6</sup> the authors will consistently employ such definitions throughout the article.

*Zeren Langjia*  
*Jian Shi*

### **Statistical Analysis of the Number of EU Terrorist Attacks**

Data talk. The number of terrorist incidents and their perpetrators is an important indicator of terror threats, and to know about them is an essential prerequisite of having a good overview of the terrorist landscape in Europe. To the end, the GTD database is used considering its high credibility and information quality. Based on the GTD<sup>7</sup>, the authors collected, categorised and statistically analysed the data of terrorist incidents that occurred in EU member states<sup>8</sup> from 1970 to 2015. The data selection is based on three GTD criteria without giving a single set definition of terrorism:

1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims;
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

Apart from these criteria, the authors exclude not only all the ambiguous cases that cannot be ensured to meet all aforementioned cri-

teria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident, but also those unsuccessful attacks that were attempted but not successfully carried out. In addition, the GTD database does not include acts of state terrorism. Moreover, in order to have a clearer overview of distribution and destruction of terror incidents, the casualty scale of single incident is grouped into four levels: level I (from one to ten casualties), level II (11 to 50 casualties), level III (51 to 100 casualties) and level IV (over 100 casualties). This categorisation of casualty level is conducive to having a thorough overview of terror scale on the one hand and is necessary for analytical simplicity on the other.

Based upon such criteria, 2273 incidents can be counted as GTD terrorist attacks in all EU MSs with one casualty at the minimum scale in a single incident since 1970. Taking the year 2001 as a watershed in contemporary terrorist history, eighty-nine percent of these incidents took place before 9/11 while only 11 percent (353) happened during the post-9/11 era. In general, there has been a dramatic drop in the number of completed terrorist attacks (see figure 1).

**Figure 1: EU Terrorist Incidents**



Fig 1 GTD doesn't have data of year 1993. EU Terrorist Incidents with minimally one casualty in each case. There are 2273 incidents. In Western Europe there are 2052 incidents with one to ten casualties and 213 incidents with over 10 casualties since 1970 and in Eastern Europe 8+6 incidents since 2004.

This does not, however, necessarily signal any reduction in the casualties, attack scale and destruction. Attacks after 2001 are actually more lethal when compared with those that occurred during the last three decades of 20th century, of which injuries count for the majority of the casualties. Another outstanding phenomenon is that the overwhelming majority of the incidents occurred in Western EU MSs while Eastern MSs face much less terror both before and after joining the

Union in 2004. Hence, there exists a disparity in casualties between Western and Eastern Europe (see figure 2).




Fig 2 The number of incidents in each year refers to the total number of the then EU Member States (from level II).

Of 2273 incidents, the overwhelming majority of attacks (2059 incidents) belong to level I. Seven percent (166) are with casualties at level II. The incidents at this level mainly occurred in the UK, France, and Spain, accounting for 37 percent (61), 20 percent (33) and 20.5 percent (34) respectively (see figure 3). There are 32 incidents with 51 to 100 casualties in each case, of which six incidents (19 percent) happened in France, 12 (38 percent) in the UK, five in Greece, three (nine percent) in Italy and Spain individually, and less than three in other member states (see figure 4). From 1973 to 2015, 16 incidents at level IV occurred in all member states, seven before 2001 and nine after 2001, of which the UK accounts for nine cases (56 percent) (see figure 5). All these 16 major attacks took place in the UK, Italy, France and Spain.

There is a dramatic drop in the number of terror incidents before and after 9/11. The total number of post-9/11 terrorist incidents is actually smaller than that of pre-9/11 ones (figure 1), which corresponds to the situations in the most terror-stricken EU MSs (figure 6). The majority of terrorist incidents happen in Western EU MSs both before and after 9/11 (figure 2). The number of pre-9/11 incidents at casualty level 11-50 and 51-100 is much larger than that of post-9/11 (figure 3 and 4), while the number of pre-9/11 incidents at casualty level over 100 is smaller than the number of post-9/11 incidents (figure 5). The comparisons have indicated that the




Fig 3 The casualties range from 11 to 50 and here are 166 incidents at this level.




Fig 4 The casualties vary from 51 to 100. These incidents mainly occurred in France, The UK, Greece, Spain, and Italy.

post-9/11 terrorist incidents are more targeted and destructive in terms of casualties, though the number gets relatively smaller. The finding is helpful to correct the false impression that terror attacks are ubiquitous and dramatically increasing. What undeniable is that media coverage of terrorism has made much contribution to such an impression, though terrorism should not be underestimated. On the other hand, these variations have also reflected that as counterterrorism policies become tougher over time, post-9/11 terrorists become more prudent and the terror incidents tend to be more well-organised, destructive and imperceptible.




Fig 5 All the major terrorist attacks took place in the western EU member states.

### Statistical Analysis of Perpetrators: Member States Case Studies

In 1970s and 1980s, Western Europe became the main theatre for terrorist incidents. The main reason for expanding terrorism is ‘its recognition as a form of low-intensity warfare that is safe and cheap to activate and dangerous and costly to counter’.<sup>9</sup> The number of incidents of each category can clearly show the distribution of terror attacks and threats in EU MSs before and after 9/11. More importantly, it visualises in a very direct way the scale and the seriousness of terror attacks over the years. In doing so, the authors assume that these figures can help people better perceive terrorist European landscape in an easy way. There is a discrepancy between major MSs and others regarding the number of terrorist incidents. The overwhelming majority of terror attacks are concentrated in the few big MSs. This is the main reason why the paper focuses on terrorism in the following EU MSs.

The number of incidents at casualty level 1-10 is quite large, and they produce much negative impact on the social order at local and regional levels. These attacks are also concentrated in the few major MSs. The UK encountered 821 incidents, of which only 84 incidents occurred in post-9/11 era. Of the 84 incidents, 18 events produced one or two fatalities in each case. Spain suffered from 341 incidents, of which 42 incidents result in fatalities ranging from two to five and 117 incidents cause two to ten (very rare) injuries in each event. Of the 42 incidents, only three occurred after 9/11. Italy ranks third with 321 incidents, of which only 18 incidents happened after 9/11 with only three events causing one fatality respectively. All 18 incidents that re-

sult in over two fatalities took place before 9/11. France experienced numerous terror attacks with 260 incidents, of which three cases produced over five fatalities in each case, 22 incidents with two to four fatalities, and 95 incidents with one fatality in each event. Relatively speaking, of the five EU MSs, Germany is the least terror-stricken country with only 109 incidents, of which eight incidents caused two to four fatalities and other 25 events with one fatality in each case. All eight incidents happened before 9/11.

In the MSs' case studies, all the incidents with at least five casualties in each incident are included. The selection is based upon three rationales: first, to select all the major attacks and main perpetrators from the innumerable cases makes it easier to closely analyse the nature of terrorist organisations and the possible relationship between different perpetrators; second, once the selection criteria are lowered, too many incidents have to be included, in which case the perpetrator groups are too diverse to categorise, and consequently it is slightly possible to designate the complex relationship between them; and third, there is not much significance in nuancing perpetrators who mostly launch attacks once only with a very few casualties or none.

Figure 6: Most Terrorism-Stricken EU MSs




Fig 6 For comparison, the time zone is divided from 1 January 1973 to 11 September 2001 and from 12 September 2001 to 31 December 2015 in all cases except Spain.

*Spain and its Basque separatist terrorism*

Since Spain joined the Union in 1986, four major incidents at level IV occurred. It was in 2004 that Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades launched four



attacks in Madrid causing about 200 fatalities and 2000 injuries. From 1986 to 2015, there are only three incidents at level III, and Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) waged all three in 1987, 1991 and 2001; during this period, there are 34 incidents at level II, of which ETA initiated 28 with nine incidents before 9/11 and 19 incidents afterwards. Besides this, Terra Lliure was held responsible for two cases, Fatah Uprising and Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army each for one case, and perpetrators of the other two cases were 'unknown' (i.e., unidentified by the GTD). Meanwhile, at level I, ETA were responsible for five of six incidents with over five casualties in each incident.

Figure 7: Incident Number of Each Perpetrator in Spain




Fig 7 Incident number of each perpetrator in Spain.

The ETA, founded in 1959, is the most active nationalist terror group in Spain. It was initially founded to fight against General Francisco Franco's repression of Basque identity during and after the Spanish Civil War and for Basque independence, but ETA 'lost its *raison d'être*' when the country became a democracy in the late 1970s and its three Basque provinces gained sweeping autonomy.<sup>10</sup> However, having believed that Spain's transition to a democracy is incomplete, radical nationalists continue to support ETA's violence.<sup>11</sup> Achieving nationhood has become their motivation behind the attacks. ETA is responsible mainly for pre-9/11 terrorist attacks and Islamic terrorist groups for the few latest but lethal incidents. As an armed Basque nationalist and separatist organisation in northern Spain and southwestern France, ETA commits transnational crimes. The group's aim shifted from being originally a purely nationalist organisation to one with a socialist Marxist dimension;<sup>12</sup> from the initial promotion of traditional Basque culture to 'establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist

principles and encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava, as well as the autonomous region of Navarra and the southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule<sup>13</sup> through intensive involvements in violent acts such as bombing, assassinations and so forth. During that time, the ETA repeatedly stated that it would only be satisfied with independence.<sup>14</sup> With such an end, ETA became a paramilitary group, playing an important role in the Basque National Liberation Movement and also being an active participant in the Basque conflicts.<sup>15</sup>

In 1974, the ETA split into two organisations: political-military ETA (ETApm) and military ETA (ETAm), of which the latter emphasises the incompatibility between politics and armed struggle and is responsible for 93 percent of the total killings (832).<sup>16</sup> Some ETA supporters, however, came to doubt its violent methods. They even created a new party called EH Bildu and adjured violence.<sup>17</sup> In October 2011, ETA group declared a permanent ceasefire and later disbanded. In a statement, ETA leaders have expressed that 'It is now time to close the era of the armed conflict (...) to offer all our strength to foment the political process.'<sup>18</sup> Thus, ETA has given way to the Basque peace process and steps upon the channels of democratic politics. People credit ETA's decision on abandonment of armed struggle to various factors. Counterterrorism efforts from the Spanish and French security forces, a slow but powerful mobilisation of civil society against ETA acts, changes set in motion within ETA's political base, and limited but essential assistance by international actors have made their contributions to the fading and disbandment of ETA group.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, notwithstanding the abandonment of physical forces, the conflicts between Basques and Spaniards continue to exist but in different parameters. Nationalism is the dominant ideology behind ETA acts, which will not disappear but linger. In particular, nationalism recently has tended to increase all around the world, and it still needs to be treated in very cautious approaches so as not to trigger unnecessary conflicts. Right-wing parties in various MSs have become increasingly active, the revival of nationalism is inevitable and nationalist voice has become stronger in policy-making mechanisms. Meanwhile, while ETA's abandon of violence could be regarded as a great progress of EH Bildu and as a success of counterterrorism, radical nationalists today do have a tendency to use physical forces.

### *France, its colonial past and Islamic terrorism*

Between 1970 and 2015 the only incident at level IV was launched by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Paris in late 2015, accompanied by three attacks with less magnitude on the same day. Incidents at level III occurred six times but all before 1996, of which Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was held responsible for the 1995 and 1996 transportation attacks, Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA) for one against police in 1986, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) for the 1983 airport and aircraft attack, and two unidentified incidents of 1986 and 1982 against business and media. In addition, 33 incidents at level II took place, three by ISIL in 2015 attacking mainly business and private citizens and property, and one raid in early 2015 on journalists, media, police, private citizens and property triggering off 24 casualties by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). All other 29 attacks happened before 9/11, of which one unidentified case was against the military in 2001 and the others were launched before 1995. GIA was responsible for four incidents attacking transportation, educational institutions, and government-related officials and institutions in general in 1995. Two incidents were credited to CSPPA, ASALA, Action Directe, and rightist Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) individually. Other perpetrators include Hezbollah, Anti-Armenian Organisation, Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO), Neo-Nazi Group, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), unaffiliated individual(s), National Movement Against the Mahgreb Invasion, Supporters of Right and Freedom, Caribbean Revolutionary Independence Army, Orly Organisation and five unidentified attackers. Apparently, perpetrators are very diverse in France, and some such as ISIL, Neo-Nazi and Hezbollah are very transnational, but not much evidence shows cooperative linkages between these different organisations. Furthermore, there are five cases with five casualties minimally at level I: one business attack by unaffiliated individual(s), one raid on airports and aircraft by PFLP and three unknown attacks against transportation and private citizens.

Pre 9/11, terrorist groups are very diverse, but Islamic terrorists are not the dominant groups. Seen from a basic schematic of terrorism in France, Action Directe espoused a radical leftist philosophy, ideologically committing to the overthrow of the capitalist system and to the downfall of American-led 'imperialism', regional separatist groups advocated independence of some specific regions of France, and then in-

*Zeren Langjia*

*Jian Shi*

Figure 8: Incident Number of Each Perpetrator in France




Fig 8 Incident number of each perpetrator in France

Note: Perpetrators in France are very diverse.

ternational terrorism of Middle Easter origin came to public notice.<sup>20</sup> At that time, though various Islamic terrorist groups existed, their destructive power was not so high.

As terrorist groups are very diverse, the antithesis between terrorist groups is another factor causing conflicts and increasing the number of incidents. Some terrorist groups are in complete antithesis to the other ones. For instance, rightist BBE came into being to resist against Basque separatist ETA, and Anti-Armenian Organisation came into existence to put up a stubborn resistance against the violence of ASALA who attempted to inflict punishment for the Turkish denial of ‘Armenian genocide’.<sup>21</sup> These groups are very active international terrorists, committing transnational crimes. Though they launch attacks in France, it doesn’t necessarily mean against French people and civilisation, for they also target foreign citizens and especially diplomatic services. For instance, ASALA in France is mainly against the Turkish instead of the French. Therefore, these terrorist organisations and attacks are closely related to age-old racial problems handed down in history.

When it comes to why France is frequently attacked by terrorists, people point to multiple factors: its republic’s specific brand of secularism – its model of *laïcité* (separation between church and state), its military interventionism in the Muslim world, discrimination against its Muslims, and its colonial history. While without denying the influence of first three factors, Nougayrède (2016) emphasises the connections between current terror acts and France’s colonial past, arguing

that 'the colonial history is not dead, and it's not even the past' and 'Nostalgia for French colonial might is still powerful, if unspoken'.<sup>22</sup> The country has to come to terms with its colonial past if an inclusive and promising future for all its citizens is in the vision of French politicians.<sup>23</sup> However, on the other hand, Sèbe (2015) argues that 'trying to make sense of the Paris attacks through the prism of colonial history only would be dangerously reductive'.<sup>24</sup> He believes terrorist attacks such as the Paris attacks reflect the self-exclusion of a very small, but extremely proactive, minority seeking to alienate communities from each other rather than the Gallic marginalisation of Muslim communities. 'If the colonial past teaches us how human connections inherited from the empire can have facilitated the implementation of last Friday's attacks [Paris attacks], it is not enough to comprehend the dynamics of present-day jihadi groups, which have an unprecedented global and fundamentally anti-Western agenda'.<sup>25</sup> Unlike anti-colonial activists, Jihadi groups are believed to seek to realise their political objectives at the expense of annihilating the West and its values.<sup>26</sup> The radical idea actually exposes that Jihadists' political goals are rooted in a zero-sum mentality, that is, either Western values or jihadi fundamentalism can exist.

Meanwhile, French engagement in secularising the Arab world has caused much trouble. This is not only an issue in France, but also in regions such as North Africa and the Arab world. Internal conflicts over secularisation within these regions can be neither denied nor ignored. The conflicts sometimes even expose the inequality between secular and non-secular classes. 'In North Africa in particular, the Francophone and predominantly secular classes were clearly preferred over their Arabic-speaking counterparts, who frequently favoured the concept of a return to an "unspoiled" pre-colonial practice of Islam'.<sup>27</sup> This is also partially a reason why jihadists point to France. France and other Western countries have supported authoritarian secular leaders of Islamic states. Thus, Western countries and even Russia, who colonised every Muslim country, 'have a moral, if not absolutely legal, obligation both (a) to make reparation to all the peoples in the Middle East, and to the Islamic world generally and (b) to foster the rule of law, human rights, and democratic institutions in all those states'.<sup>28</sup> Though current terror attacks cannot be fully attributed to French colonial history, Islamic secularisation has been highly internationalised due to connections established from its colonial past.

French terrorist attacks are featured in an increasing share of notable Islamic groups stemming from the Middle East regions such as GIA, AQAP, ISIL, Hezbollah, PFLP, ANO and CSPPA. The attribute certainly gives its credit to its colonial history with regard to understanding the French terrorist situation.<sup>29</sup> French colonial and control power exerts great impact on Muslim countries, such as Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, and so forth. France has never completely severed relations with these countries and people from these regions come to work and live in France. Nevertheless, due to unemployment, educational disadvantages and cultural backgrounds, these settlers are marginalised and driven to live in some ostracised communities, where the anger and dissatisfaction of these people allow their communities to become not only the hotbed of Islamic terrorists but also the follow-up forces of Islamic terrorists. As a consequence, the acts arouse the ire of French nationalists and citizens that widens the rift between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and deepens the racial conflicts. Terrorist groups such as the Algerian-based Islamic Armed Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and later al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) all 'blamed France for its colonial history and its ties with Algiers' perceived infidel government' and 'criticized the French for being impious and perverted'.<sup>30</sup> The current ISIS repeatedly puts much stress upon these essentialist remarks, and their rationales for targeting France include its 'anti-Muslim policies', its military intervention in the Muslim world, and propagandising Jihadi values through creating chaos in French society.<sup>31</sup> France is forced to pay the price for old problems. Terrorism not only emanates from racial problems, but it also deepens racial rifts – a vicious circle.

Last but not least, high proportions of unidentified terrorist attacks are another conspicuously noticeable feature. It indirectly indicates the difficulty in gathering intelligence and tracing perpetrators, and the consequential failure of identification becomes undoubtedly inevitable; on the other hand, abundant intelligence collecting, and successful terrorist identification are the main determinants of preventing and countering future attacks. If security agencies have the intention of nipping the terrorist atrocities in the bud, then more efforts need to be made so as to better collect and share information and track perpetrators. The fact has also exposed the high invisibility of contemporary terror acts.

### *UK and threats from Irish republicanism*

Since joining the Union in 1973, the UK went through nine major attacks at level IV by the very end of 2015, of which Secret Organisation of al-Qaida in Europe (SOQE) claimed responsibility for four aimed at transportation explosion in 2005 that gave rise to 56 fatalities and around 800 injuries in total and Irish Republican Army (IRA) was held responsible for three with one attack in 1973 on the military and government in general, one business attack and one against private citizens and property in 1990s. Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) made one raid on private citizens and property with a result of 29 fatalities and 220 injuries in 1998, and one serious airport and aircraft attack, in which 270 people died but its perpetrators were unidentified.

The UK also suffered 12 terrorist incidents of level III. Protestant Extremists launched the latest one in 2013 with opposition against police, and it was also responsible for another attack against private citizens and property in 1988. IRA waged seven attacks mainly on private citizens, property, business and government with one exception of the 1984 transportation attack. Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) attacked against business, which caused 16 fatalities and 66 casualties in 1982. Moreover, police and business came under attacks from unknown perpetrators in 1980 and 1991, of which 37 people were killed in the former and 70 people were injured in the latter.

Sixty-one incidents at level II were launched. IRA was responsible for 47, of which there were 12 attacks on police, 14 on private citizens and property, 12 on business, six on government in general, two on transportation, and one on educational institution. Apart from five unknown attacks, other perpetrators include RIRA, Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) (suspected), Orange Volunteers (OV), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), Protestant Extremists, Supporters of Qadhafi, PFLP, and Red Flag. All these perpetrators committed only once in terms of this casualty scale. Furthermore, at level I eight incidents with over five casualties took place. IRA attacked six times with five on police and one on private citizens and property. Republican Action Force and UVF were responsible for one incident respectively with ten fatalities by the former and five fatalities by the latter.

*Zeren Langjia*

*Jian Shi*

**Figure 9: Incident Number of Each Perpetrator in UK**




Fig 9 Incident number of each perpetrator in UK

Of all these attacks, IRA accounts for 70 percent (see figure 9). IRA was dedicated to Irish republicanism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and for the independence of the Northern Ireland. IRA, founded in 1919 during the formation of the Irish State, is a nationalist terrorist organisation to reunite Ireland through incorporating the six counties of Northern Ireland where the majority population is Protestant.<sup>32</sup> It has been fighting for territorial claim (independence or greater autonomy for territory) and thus is involved in a war of attrition with the State, distinguishing itself from revolutionary, fascist and religious terrorism.<sup>33</sup> For IRA, terrorism was a necessary political instrument to realise its ambition. It can attract British and world attention with low cost. As IRA has a rival relationship with Loyalists, they take revenge on each other through terror attacks. In 1960s, the IRA organisation was almost dead, and then some Republican nationalist members split from the IRA in 1969 and created the Provisional IRA (PIRA).<sup>34</sup> PIRA holds divergent political orientations on how to deal with the increasing violence in Northern Ireland. It had many more killings during 1969 to 2001, and at the same time repression in Northern Ireland is much stronger than in the Basque country (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2007, p. 292). The Official IRA (OIRA) as the remainder of the IRA was also active. OIRA broke from the PIRA in 1986 because the latter called for an end on its abstentionism and RIRA, a 1997 breakaway from PIRA and consisting of members disrupting the Northern Ireland peace process<sup>35</sup>,



has grown into the largest dissident republican organisation. All these branches resort to violence under the name of unifying Ireland. Nationhood or statehood sentiment plays a crucial role in sparking off IRA-related groups to wage attacks. As a result, the UK Loyalist attacks on citizens became a reaction to IRA's attempt from integrating the North Ireland into the Republic of Ireland. Loyalists were engaged in 'assassination of republican figures, whether from Sinn Fein or from the IRA, or of ordinary Catholics in retaliation for IRA actions and in an attempt to force the nationalist community to rein in the IRA'<sup>36</sup> to terrorise their opponents. That is, wanton slaughter of innocent people becomes a political instrument for IRA and Loyalists to win a concession from each other. Consequently, nationalism is locked in a vicious circle of taking revenge.

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Union*

Meanwhile, this is also a very religion-based terrorist act. Believing that IRA and other IRA-related groups are in doubt to be supported by Irish Catholic community, staunchly protestant loyalists<sup>37</sup> launched attacks on Catholic civilians so as to coerce Irish authorities into abandoning their intention of unifying the North Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. The IRA's campaign took place in the context of an ethnic conflict between two communities (Catholic and Protestant) divided by religion.<sup>38</sup> The PIRA has received substantial support from Northern Irish Catholics and achieved a great deal regarding its efforts to establish a united Irish republic, but it cannot overcome the hostility of Northern Irish Protestants to Irish unification.<sup>39</sup> Due to the religious identity of religious figures and institutions behind the pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist movements, religion is naturally and unavoidably perceived as an element of the terrorist/counterterrorist relationship.

Attracting media coverage is an objective of terrorists to receive international attention and diplomatic recognition. The IRA clearly knows that an explosion in London is worth a hundred in Belfast.<sup>40</sup> For instance, on 12 October 1984, the group attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was present at the annual conference of Conservative Party. On the other hand, in response to such an increasing threat of both national and international terrorism, the UK government expressed its strong determination and willingness to respond, which 'has incorporated antiterrorist legislation, strong administrative measures, and an outstanding special military unit',<sup>41</sup> The reciprocal terrorist/counterterrorist relationship between the PIRA and the British authorities has demonstrated that the PIRA

systematically adapts to counterterrorist policies pursued by the authorities while the latter correspondingly adopts new counterterrorist tactics according to the former's response.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, the two parties, instead of resorting to military approaches to defeat one another, seem locked in a ritualistic dance of death, which can never end due to the inexhaustibility of their adaptive capability.<sup>43</sup> Thus, how to balance terrorist and counterterrorist relationship has been and will be a challenge.

Later on, the IRA also shifted from resorting to physical forces to peaceful approaches. On August 31, 1994, the IRA agreed to eschew armed struggle as a means to achieve its political objective of Irish unity and enter a peace process, but the republican dream of an Irish Ireland may remain until it is realised even without the need of physical force. As Bell says, 'The IRA would be different but the same'.<sup>44</sup>

Since 1980s, Islamic terrorism was already present. Middle Eastern terrorist groups carried out several assassinations against dissidents living in the UK (such as attacks at the Iraqi embassy, the Libyan embassy and the Iranian embassy).<sup>45</sup> After 9/11, Islamic terrorism is increasing. Islamic terrorism is ethnic terrorism. Ethnic terrorists very often seek to influence mainly their own constituencies, to foster communal identity, to target potential intermediaries, and also to arouse a fear among its rival groups.<sup>46</sup> There is no exception for Islamic terrorists. Nevertheless, religious belief is not the direct factor generating terrorist acts. Some groups of people (e.g., radical extremists and nationalists) deliberately create conflicts under the name of religion, though different ideologies behind various religions cannot be denied. The political intention of these people is much stronger than religious motivation regarding the terrorist acts.

### *Italy and its political violence*

Two incidents at level IV occurred in Florence and Bologna, but both took place in the 1980s. Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), New Order and Red Brigades together organised an attack on transportation causing 15 fatalities and 112 injuries (see figure 5). NAR was also suspected to launch the other major transportation attack in which 76 people were killed and 188 were injured. There are three incidents at level III, of which two attacks with 97 and 80 casualties respectively on airports and aircraft were organised by Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) in 1985 and by Black September in 1973 and one transportation attack

with 60 casualties by Black Order in 1974; meanwhile, 13 level II incidents happened. Except the unidentified raid on private citizens and property in 2003 and the attack on government by Mafia in 1992, the remainder occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) was responsible for one airports and aircraft attack and one business attack, ASALA for two airports and aircraft concerned cases, and NAR for two attacks on government in general. Red Brigades, Black Lebanon and Black Order each are responsible for one case, and plus two unknown incidents in 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, Red Brigades, Mafia and Prima Linea organised three incidents at level I with five and over casualties in each case (see figure 10). The Red Brigade is also an interesting example connecting its rise and fall with political terrorist development.<sup>47</sup>

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**Figure 10: Incident Number of Each Perpetrator in Italy**




Fig 10 Incident number of each perpetrator in Italy

Italian terror is mostly characterised by political violence. The terrorist incidents mostly occurred in 1970s and 1980s. The characteristic has much to do with the then Italian domestic social instability and political turmoil. This period, known as the Years of Lead,<sup>48</sup> is marked by a wave of epidemic social conflicts and unprecedented political terrorism. Italian society at that time was rife with public protests, labour unrest, student strikes, rampant political violence and the birth of various terrorist groups. Moreover, in post-war Italy, '[p]olice operations against political protests, often preceded or accompanied by "preventive repression", were shaped by military problem solutions

not excluding the use of firearms'.<sup>49</sup> In particular, internal unbalanced socio-economic development, the turbulent social situations and tensions between the rulers and the ruled, the crisis of the family that the family as a social unit is 'no longer able to fulfil its function of socialization',<sup>50</sup> and so forth have deepened conflicts over these issues and aggravated the social crisis. Eventually, all these problems together led to the concentrated appearance of numerous terrorist incidents during these two decades. Political scandals and corruption triggered violent reactions by marginal groups, and the situation is further deteriorated due to the crisis in state education, which represents a principal cause of intellectual unemployment; dissatisfaction with lack of demand regarding educational qualifications gave rise to dangerous frustration; unemployment breeds an inborn stimulus, also irrational, towards violent behaviour during that time, and the climax in the explosions of terrorism took place with the students' revolt in October 1977.<sup>51</sup> All these issues are highly intertwined and interdependent. Therefore, eliminating domestic socio-economic roots and political roots of terrorism is a prerequisite of tackling international terrorism and its international connections. '[T]errorism should never simply be labeled a political demon or a foreign plot devoid of internal causes'; instead, it is mostly 'a terrible domestic socio-politico-cultural cancer, corrupting from the inside any "stagnant" society, incapable of overcoming its inner contradictions and fragility'.<sup>52</sup>

The then Italian crisis is also believed to have originated 'in the gap between mass aspirations and lack of means, in the weak and collapsing civil infrastructure, and in the ruling class, which is corrupted by favouritism and, perhaps, nepotism'.<sup>53</sup> According to Santoro et al. (1987),<sup>54</sup> inter-party conflicts have resulted in much variation in the degree to which parties have consensus on the issue of international terrorism and thus have stopped Italy from fully cooperating with the US and its European partners in the war against terror, though the four most prominent political parties stand in principle against terrorism. However, the main targeting objects are materials rather than people. During that time, an apparent common purpose of terror attacks is to overthrow the political institutions of the country.<sup>55</sup> In particular, in a strange democracy without any alternation of political power and few replacements, the forces of the extreme Right and extreme Left become 'a source of ever-increasing tension that explodes in inhumane violence against property and people'.<sup>56</sup>

Terrorists intend 'to break up the state by showing that the state is incapable both of condemning those who conspire against peaceful coexistence and of making the law respected'.<sup>57</sup> In doing so, terrorists attempt to create a situation of uncertainty or insecurity. When the rules and the limits set to regulate behaviours are disrespected and the social structure and organisation are undermined, there arises in the consociates a widespread phenomenon of contestation of the entire ruling system, which may lead to a situation of uncertainty and insecurity.<sup>58</sup> As a consequence, people's reaction to such a situation may be distinguished by two forms: one with activity and the other with passivity, of which there develops political terrorism in the former form and there arises self-isolation from society and the passive refusal of the social system.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, for the country, showing citizens the efficiency of its institutions is of great significance because vulnerable institutions allow the growth and proliferation of terrorist acts on the one hand and citizens, in fear of being retaliated, are unwilling to cooperate with their states in struggle against terror on the other hand. It is argued that superprisons and increased penalties are not the solutions to the terror problem; instead, the complete reorganisation and restructuring of the state is the solution.<sup>60</sup> It is argued that:

When a state can demonstrate the solidity of its own structures, its capacity for rapidly solving social problems and for guaranteeing orderly living conditions, the problem of terrorism will automatically be solved; insecurity and tension, which are the principal causes of the phenomenon, will be eliminated and the terrorists will be isolated.<sup>61</sup>

Deficiency of state institutions weakens the enforcement of counterterrorism. Therefore, the firmness of its institutions, their capacity for tackling social problems and ensuring social orders, strong social solidarity, and citizens' confidence in the state's competence are the most important premises to address terrorist issues. Terrorists attempt to manipulate and destroy the relationship between public authorities and citizens.

The indiscriminate strategy of terror is targeted to sever the traditional ties of trust and protection between state and people once state governments are believed to be unable to combat terrorism without resorting to equally indiscriminate violence.<sup>62</sup> Hence, serious considerations need to be given to both the strategy of terror and the strategy

of counterterrorism. On the one side, indiscriminate counterterrorist policies are highly likely to arouse the public's anger (e.g., the ordinary Muslim people), and people will harbour resentment against the state. On the other side, indiscriminate strategies of terror cause many casualties that will make people disappointed about the state's incapability of effectively controlling terror. Special attention needs to be paid to the strategy of terror as 'violent action represents the most effective system through which a group, small in number and means, may immediately achieve public notoriety'.<sup>63</sup>

The outstanding political terrorism can also be observed from the Italian institutional response to terrorism. Italian terrorism in 1970s was overwhelmingly a phenomenon of the Left, which conceived itself as a means of bringing about a Communist regime and regarded its terrorists as the competitors and reformers of the Italian Communist party.<sup>64</sup> During the 'immobilist' period (1970-74), the Italian secret service protected right-wing terrorism, which was more serious at that time, but left-wing terrorism was not considered as a threat; the situation changed when the right-wing terrorism declined during the second phase (1974-76), and the authorities put more repression on left-wing terrorism; the Emergency period (1977-82) was characterised by a new wave of left-wing terrorism and mounting repression that eventually promoted terrorist recruitment; however, the left-wing terrorism was defeated during the fourth period (1982-89) through new anti-terrorist policies, such as amnesty and repentance laws.<sup>65</sup>

However, unlike rightist groups in the other Western democracies, Italian right-wing terrorism for the most part has been targeted at Communists and other leftists rather than racial or ethnic minorities.<sup>66</sup> According to the autobiographical literature of Italian terrorists on the left and rights, there exists a cultural history of anti-democratic violence on both political extremes in Italy, and any endeavour to understand the problem of Italian terrorism during the second half of the last century must start with a historical examination of the ideas and values motivating the terrorists. This indicates that the Left and Right have conflicting views not only on how to respond terrorism but also on how to govern democratic systems. Consequently, inter-party conflict is indeed a source of terrorism, but casualties at that time were not high.

Apart from the aspect of overwhelming political violence, Italian terrorism is also featured in a broad spectrum of perpetrators and each

perpetrator very often carries out a raid once or twice only. This makes it difficult to distinguish one terrorist group from another with regard to the casualty scale and incident frequency. De facto weakness exposes the difficulty in collecting intelligence and identifying terrorist organisations to light. Like the French case, unidentified incidents make up 14 percent of the total, which is quite serious considering the large number of casualties of all the unknown incidents. Therefore, intelligence sharing is of great importance in respect of preventing single incidents since many perpetrator groups do not commit a second time to be discovered.

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In recent years, Italy is a country which is 'experiencing a very weak threat, but highly engaged in counterterrorism security operations and highly prolific in the anti-terrorism domestic legislative and judicial production'.<sup>67</sup> Its counterterrorism privileges 'a comprehensive – and not strictly military – response to the terrorist threat'<sup>68</sup> so as to effectively control the spread of terrorism.

### **Terrorist Menace and EU Counterterrorism Challenges**

Both terrorist menace and EU counterterrorism challenge are always there but come into sight in different ways at different given time. The price of destroying terrorism through indiscriminate counterterrorism is the disintegration of national social values.<sup>69</sup> Counterterrorism thus must be carried out in very cautious ways. According to the aforementioned analyses, terrorist identification through intelligence sharing, increasing tendency of Islamic terror attacks and particularly armed individuals, and soft target-oriented attacks are some tough threats and challenges the EU has to deal with.

#### *Intelligence sharing and terrorist identification*

Though the EU and its MSs have spent years of wrangling over intelligence sharing, it is very difficult to make a major breakthrough considering the divergent and controversial interpretations in MSs. The loose cooperation in intelligence sharing consequently results in intelligence scarcity both for EU institutions and the MSs. Various cases have shown that some attacks, which could be prevented, are successfully launched due to a lack of shared intelligence. Hence, closer intelligence cooperation and coordination is supposed to make productive contributions to not only identifying and deterring perpetrators but also preventing potential attacks.

An important prerequisite for prevention takes the form of successful intelligence collection before the unpredictable incoming attacks. While free movements policies of the EU Schengen Agreement have created unprecedented freedom and convenience for European citizens, they concurrently provide favourable conditions for those who misuse the policies and commit crimes. In the face of this dilemma, closer (police) cooperation in intelligence is one crucial way, if not the only way, for the EU institutions and MSs to nip potential menaces in the bud. Without intelligence support from national authorities, European institutions have much trouble moving forward, and so do the MSs.

In particular, given that '[i]n the EU terrorists – but not policemen – can move easily across national frontiers',<sup>70</sup> the cooperative necessity for intelligence sharing has to be brought to the fore. The extant data demonstrates that a considerable proportion of perpetrators cannot be identified even after the attacks. The unidentified perpetrators account for four percent in Spain's case, 22 percent in France's case, nine percent in the UK's case, 14 percent in Italy's case, and 27 percent in Germany's case. These unknown incidents are quite serious with regard to their casualty scale because there are five fatalities or ten casualties (i.e. both fatality and injuries) at the minimum in single incident.

Promoting closer joint cooperation between European institutions and the MSs and establishing technical structure of pan-European intelligence will make great sense in strengthening national intelligence and building up the European level intelligence service. Take the late 2015 Paris attacks for example. If France, as the leading country, allows proactive participation of European institutions and other MSs in the investigation after the attacks, both France and other participants will be the beneficiaries of investigation achievements to probably prevent potential attacks because they could not only exchange information but also learn how to better cooperate and coordinate during the investigation process. It is not merely a way of gathering European institutions and member states together to jointly work on certain issue that concerns each party, but a test ground for trust and 'unity in diversity' between these agents. It is also about 'technical structure allowing for information sharing and joint analysis'.<sup>71</sup> By the end of the day, it is also an instrumental portion of further promoting European integration.



### *Rising destructive power of Islamic groups and 'lone wolves'*

Islamic terrorist groups, particularly 'Lone Wolves', were not so rampant in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. They came into view at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and 9/11 officially heralded the new but crisis-ridden century. Ever since, Islamic terrorist attacks have followed hard on another. The Madrid train bombing, 7/7 London Bombings, the more recent Brussels Airport Attacks, twice Paris attacks and Nice attacks shocked Europe and the world, and more precisely speaking, all these aforementioned world-wide known attacks were launched by Islamic groups. For instance, the latest major attacks in Madrid are Islamic-waged incidents; France had been free from any terrorist attacks for the past fifteen years until the latest Paris and Nice attacks launched by ISIL and AQAP; and the London bombings, which are the only major attacks in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the UK, were carried out by Secret Organisation of al-Qaida in Europe. These terrorist incidents are not the only ones, but they are influential enough to make people feel frozen with terror, to enable them to forge a strong psychological line of defence, and to discourage them from interacting with Muslim communities, which in turn makes it more difficult for people with Islamic backgrounds to be better integrated into European society or European ways of social life that will certainly be detrimental to the smooth integration development of the Union in general. Islamic terrorist attacks are more powerful and destructive than those ethno-nationalist and separatist attacks. As a consequence, the peaceful continental paradise gets involved into an Islamic terrorist battlefield, and a strong sense of insecurity stretches over the continent.

Racial hatred and estrangement between Muslim and non-Muslim people is one of the thorniest problems. The outcome of growing Islamic terrorism may even become a Pandora's Box, inflicting not only great harm on European citizens but also tremendous damage on the European social order. Particularly, racial tension is dramatically mounting when nationalists and right-wing extremists seize the opportunity to stir up troubles. As time passes, the racial chasm is gradually widened. This will be a political time bomb on the route to an in-depth European integration unless the rift is really psychologically healed instead of being deceptively concealed. Meanwhile, it is certainly not a wise act either to ostracise and marginalise all the Muslims due to some crimes of some particular groups or individuals. Instead, they should be more integrated and more middle-of-the-roaders are needed to lessen and

*Terrorism  
Situation in  
European  
Union*

possibly minimise bilateral tensions. Porta stresses the importance of reintegrating former terrorists involving terrorist organisations into society.<sup>72</sup> However, former terrorists and their acts differ from contemporary terrorists and their activity in many ways. As a result, it will be different regarding whether they should be reintegrated into society or not. If yes, then the question is how to reintegrate.

To better integrate Muslim citizens into European society, civil power of Muslim communities and successful European Muslim individuals as middlemen could make contributions to bridging the gap between radical Muslims (especially the younger generation) and European mainstream society. These middlemen could play quite important roles not only because they are capable of setting a good example for the juvenile delinquents or potential terrorists, but also because they have closer blood ties and cultural connection with these people and can make sense of what is going on there with them. Besides, the middlemen are very likely to be the first to have a premonition of a terror attack and discover the problem, which will render great assistance to security agencies to collect incipient signs of terror. Due attention has not been paid to this function. They are sometimes forced into a situation where they have to cover up for their compatriots and allow their crimes when nationalists and other anti-Muslim groups exclude and discriminate them on account of their religious or cultural identity rather than judging the case as it stands. Religion cannot be regarded as the scapegoat of both terrorist and counterterrorist. Drawing distinctions between 'religious' and 'secular' terrorism is problematic both at the conceptual and empirical levels because the behaviours of so-called religious terrorists is very often indistinguishable from their 'secular' counterparts.<sup>73</sup>

Eliminating stereotyped cultural labels is of great importance to reduce mutual misunderstanding between ethnic groups. In the case of Islamic terrorism, Muslims are dramatically stereotyped, prejudiced and demonised ever since September 11. Muslim people are 'deemed responsible for the "crime" of their religious identity, stigmatised and labelled as outsiders purely as a result of being Muslim', and the extant studies have found that 'visible markers of "Muslimness" are connected with a rise in the probability of experiencing marginalization, racism and issues over access to employment, as well as daily discrimination in the form of verbal and even physical assault and violence'.<sup>74</sup> Bonino argues, 'the employment of soft approaches aimed at combating

and preventing radicalization should be given priority over hard power approaches, which could further the isolation, embitterment and targeting of Muslims and, in turn, play into the hands of terrorists and recruiters.<sup>75</sup>

Another function of civil power in general including all the citizens is the role of supervision and harmonisation. It takes the entire society to fully advance the peace process of European integration because the process per se affects the personal and social interests of all European citizens. On the one hand, when it comes to the *supervision* function of civil power, citizens have a say in the matter because different people have various access to the information concerned and they could clue the police or intelligence service in about suspects or anything suspicious. They could definitely be the extended eyes and ears of intelligence services and more exactly the mobile surveillance cameras. In this sense, citizens are more conceived as snitches or informants. On the other hand, real social interactions and comprehensive integration takes full engagement of all citizens. Respect for being different, productive conversations, interaction between cultures and religions and so forth are believed to do contributions to establishing a harmonious relationship between citizens with diverse backgrounds regardless of political orientation, religious belief, cultural belongings, etc. Therefore, a solution to discovering the initial signs of 'grassroots jihadists'<sup>76</sup> or potential attackers could be found in a cooperative effort between security agencies and the public.

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### *Terrorism and its increasing soft targets*

The landscape of terrorist target types is changing and soft target attacks<sup>77</sup> are very likely to be a new normal. Soft target attacks account for a remarkable proportion in the cases of Spain, France, Italy and the UK. Specifically, among the top ten target types - business, private citizens and property, transportation, airports and aircraft, the government-related in general count for 27 percent, 21 percent, ten percent, ten percent and ten percent respectively while attacks on police make up 20% and on the military-related only two percent (see figure 11). The soft target attacks' proportion is about 80 percent as a rough calculation when the attacks on police are fully excluded from soft target category.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn as follows.




Fig 11 Terrorist target types

Attacks on transportation are very often major incidents and inflict the greatest losses with regard to casualties, infrastructure damages, social impact and so forth. The major terrorist incidents in European cities all attest to the tremendous destructive power of transportation attacks. The four Madrid transportation attacks in 2004 by Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (suspected) led to the serious consequences of 191 fatalities and about 1800 injuries; the latest four major transportation attacks in London in 2005 by SOQE resulted in 56 fatalities and 784 injuries; the 1996 and 1995 Paris transportation attacks by GIA (suspected) are the most deadly incidents before 2015 with an outcome of ten fatalities and 177 injuries; and the 1984 Florence transportation attack by Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), New Order and Red Brigades gave rise to 15 deaths and 112 injuries; and the 1980 Bologna incident by NAR (suspected) resulted in 76 fatalities and 188 injuries. In addition, the transportation attacks could temporarily paralyse transportation services but from a long-term perspective make the whole public transportation system malfunctioning. Apart from the economic losses and physical damage, transportation attacks, with a high possibility of reaching more victims, can maximise the sense of terror and traumatised civilians because soft targets instil more fear in the general public than hard targets.<sup>79</sup> The effect of causing public panic reflects one important dimension of the definition of the term terrorism: to spread fear and terror among the target groups. Transportation malfunction can exert huge impact on citizens and their daily life. Destroying trans-

portation systems often brings much inconvenience for citizens, and the inconvenience will increase the publicity of terrorism. The further purpose of causing fear is that terrorist groups want the public to put pressure on the authorities and let them change the country's foreign policies concerned. As a result, the state will suffer from public pressure. For instance, the public opposes military intervention in the Muslim world.

The fact that very few terrorist attacks were against religious figures and institutions has demonstrated that more serious considerations need to be given to the parlance that religion or religious incompatibility is at the root of terrorist incidents. Though the small number of attacking religious figures and institutions does not necessarily prove that terrorists do not launch attacks based upon religious causes, the intertwined relationship between religion and terrorism needs further clarification. For a long time, the differences of religious doctrines and beliefs are believed to be reasonable explanations for terrorist acts between religious factions. For instance, the terrorist activities of IRA and British protestant loyalists are closely related to religious backgrounds; the Islamic terrorist groups even claim themselves to be the real followers and practitioners of Islam; and so forth. Nevertheless, there are only two incidents in the EU claimed against religious figures and institutions since 1970: one is the 1982 Italian case by Black Lebanon causing 38 casualties and the other is the 1980 French case by Neo-Nazi Group generating 16 casualties. This stark contrast requests security agencies and counterterrorism practitioners to further reflect upon the delicate interconnectivity between religion and terrorism and to see through the false appearances artificially created by attackers for the purpose of hiding their bad intentions and distracting people's attention from finding out the reasons behind their crimes.

The incremental trend of soft target attacks results from both terrorist strategic change and counterterrorism policies. Like the US counterterrorism targeting hierarchy groups,<sup>80</sup> the EU counterterrorism policies and approaches to a large extent manage to block terrorist groups or organisations from launching attacks but hardly ward off 'Lone Wolf' attacks. The EU is thereby becoming a victim of its own accomplishment. However, 'lone wolves' are not really alone. French police investigations have indicated that 'lone wolves' often retain ties with other radicals through the Internet or in real life and are encouraged to take up action independently by Jihadis.<sup>81</sup> The cultural and geo-

graphical proximity is a big concern of France. Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian nationals, who are reportedly thought to fight in Syria, speak French and can be sent to France. What's worse, French authorities have much less capability of controlling these groups of people. Jihadis have employed 'a full spectrum of terror tactics to try and undermine France'.<sup>82</sup> Nevertheless, due to lacking weapons of mass destruction and professional terrorist tradecraft, the armed or semi-armed individuals or so-called 'Lone Wolves' are inadequate for attacking hard targets such as military units and other well-armed forces. Consequently, 'in selecting targets, IS appears to prefer soft targets because they are more effective than attacks on critical infrastructure, the military, police and other hard targets'.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, soft targets are not only easily reached, but also more *effective* for the attackers to make influence.

'Lone Wolves' actions are most effective when their objects are soft targets. When European countries, along with the US, launched a series of tough crackdown on Islamic terrorist groups, group actions decreased. The extant EU counterterrorism strategy has four strands: prevent, protect, pursue and respond,<sup>84</sup> which is very self-protective and conservative, particularly focusing on internal governance and security. It is much less possible for terrorist groups to infiltrate the Union without being discovered. Even within the Union, group actions are increasingly constrained. As a result, terrorist groups recognised the necessity of changing their strategy through guiding, training and arming potential attackers with essential skills and probably small weapons that can render them competent in conducting independent but seriously influential attacks. These armed individuals and semi-armed ones sneak into Europe and freely shuttle to and fro colluding with Muslim natives and targeting potential victims. Recently, instead of taking the risk of accessing to Europe, they prefer remote control over and radicalisation of homegrown terrorists to dispatching attackers to the targeted places. 'Remote radicalization exploits the growing global interconnectivity, its ability to move money, share information, and manipulate modern technology'.<sup>85</sup>

## Conclusion

To conclude, while political violence has decreased, the opposite is true for nationalism. Nationalism continues to be a thorny problem. The rise of right-wing parties is a sign of the tendency. ETA, IRA, IRA branches and many others are very active nationalist terrorist groups

which leave a legacy behind. Though both ETA and IRA initiated to stop resorting to physical forces as a means to achieve their political goals and their intention of quitting physical forces matters very much, the underlying nationalist ideologies are still lingering. Some right-wing radicals actually tend to use armed struggles, to which special attention must be paid.

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Islamic terrorism has increased but not in a dramatic way. A big challenge is that Islamic terrorism is highly unpredictable, imperceptible and destructive. Unlike ETA, IRA and other nationalist groups, it will take a much longer time to reach agreement on a peace process between Islamic terrorists and European authorities as Islamic issues are more sensitive and complex. Islamic terrorist motivations are very multiple and overlapping. All political, ideological, religious and racial themes are intertwined. This makes it very difficult to observe the problems. Meanwhile, it is extremely important to distinguish war on terror from war against Islam. While national authorities prefer war on terror in their political discourse, Islamic terror groups attempt to enhance the narrative of war against Islam so as to aggravate contradictions between Western and Muslim worlds.

As terrorists increasingly prefer to attack civilians in a view to attracting world attention, how to protect soft targets and how to maintain mutual trust between citizens and the state come to the fore regarding counterterrorism. Unarmed civilians are exposed to any potential terror attacks, which has been and will be a huge challenge to meet. Counterterrorist policies must take into serious account this weakness as nobody can guarantee a terror-free society.

Last but not least, how to give a quick response to emergency situations is another challenge as an increasing number of terror attacks happen without warning. Unpredictability and suddenness are the most challenging aspects of counterterrorism. Answers must be sought based upon experiences from history and upon predictions for future. As people tend to focus merely on the latest terrorist developments in the world, it is of great importance to take lessons from former terror incidents and examine the dynamics of what transpired many years ago. Terrorism is an age-old problem and challenge. Counterterrorism will be a long-term undertaking. That 'terrorism is part of daily reality'<sup>86</sup> will be a new normal. Many characteristics of terrorism remain the same, though some new aspects are increasingly emphasised.

The article suggests that these findings have implications for counterterrorist policies and further academic scholarship. Further research should be done to regarding the delicate relations between religion and terrorism, the sensitive relations between politics and terrorism, and the historical national backgrounds of terrorism, and to make informative sense for counterterrorism decision-making.



ZEREN LANGJIA is joint PhD researcher of Sichuan University of China and Ghent University of Belgium. His main doctoral research field is EU normative foreign policies with a focus on human rights promotion. Can be reached at [zeren.langjia@ugent.be](mailto:zeren.langjia@ugent.be).

PROF. DR. JIAN SHI is Jean Monnet Chair Professor and the Director of Centre for European Studies and Centre for EU Studies (Excellence of Jean Monnet Centre) at Sichuan University, China. His main research topics are EU-China relations focusing on cultural and social perspectives and international education cooperation. Can be reached at [jishi@scu.edu.cn](mailto:jishi@scu.edu.cn).

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### **Notes**

- 1 The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) makes the GTD available via the online interface: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/>. The START is A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, USA. For more detailed information about data collection efforts, the strengths and weaknesses of the GTD, see Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan (2007), 'Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 181-204.



- 2 Jonathan Andre Matusitz (2013), *Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction*, Thousand Oaks, Chicago: SAGE, pp. 3-4. Google book, available at: <[https://books.google.ru/books/about/Terrorism\\_and\\_Communication.html?id=iYogAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp\\_read\\_button&redir\\_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.ru/books/about/Terrorism_and_Communication.html?id=iYogAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false)> (accessed 20 June 2018).
- 3 Jeffrey D. Simon (1994), *The Terrorist Trap*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- 4 Ariel Merari (1993), 'Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 5 (4), pp. 213-251.
- 5 Cited from Matusitz, 2013. For more detailed information about various definitions of terrorism of various scholars and institutions, see Matusitz, 2013.
- 6 Global Terrorism Database (2017). *Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables*, June, p. 9.
- 7 All the data in the article are from Global Terrorism Database unless specified, and there is no data of 1993.
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